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Abstract
It was not very long ago that Western law was formed from the rib of
Graeco-Roman law, and our modern Western legal systems, civil code-based and
common law alike, demonstrate that lineage, and the contributions of both
societies, to surcease. While other cultural influences, including those from even
more ancient sources may be identifiable, this article segregates Greco-Roman
law for separate analysis for purposes of manageability.
This article tracks the law of early Greece and early Rome from their
respective origins in myth and legend to their comprehensive codifications. For
the disparities in form and content, there are nonetheless significant similarities.
These include (1) the cohering of laws giving security to society; (2) the
movement from vengeance as a remedy to compensation; (3) the identification of
a great array of personal injury and dignitary wrongs, as well as wrongs to
property interestsfor which civil remedies might be sough t; (4) the introduction
of fault-based liability for certain harms; and (5) the introduction of equity so as
to permit the rendition of justice in circumstances in which existing law or its
absence might preclude it.
The article concludes with the proposition that the law of ancient Greece, and
that of ancient Rome, each contributed a necessary, but not by itself sufficient,
foundation of the Western law that would follow. To the Hellenic contribution of
ethics, dialectical reasoning and rudimentary codification would be added Roman
systematization and a millennium of cultural and legal tradition that resulted in
the great Graeco-Roman law traditions that have left a lasting imprint on the
terrain of modern Western law.

* Distinguished Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, and Visiting
Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law 2005-2006.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
All legal systems, and the norms and mores that preceded them, originate in a

cultural context. The distinctive form of each system reveals a symbiotic relationship
with the society and the social order it serves. The law of ancient Greece, and that of
ancient Rome, developed in cultural environs that were strongly status based, with the
factors of such status associated with land, lineage, sex and condition of servitude.
At least as far as their respective contributions to systematization of Western law in
general, and the law of delict in particular, there is no bright line at which point the
2

Grecian influence disappeared and the Roman sequelae came to dominance. As the
vitality of Athenian legal contributions came to wane, their codes, and even their living
jurists, were in personal contact with, and were an acknowledged influence upon, Roman
“law givers”. Indeed, the Grecian philosophical influences of dialectical reasoning, and
the legal codifications Draco and Solon, were contemporaneous with important
developments in Roman law, and available to study by Roman Jurisconsuls.
This article tracks the law of early Greece and early Rome from their respective
origins in myth and legend, through their primitive and customary law, concluding with
their initial written legal recordations and their later comprehensive codifications. The
review reveals significant similarities and disparities between the respective approaches.
At the most primary level and at the earliest times, we see the cohering of norms, and
then laws, that give order and security to society. Over time, and through revisions that
are quite literally millennial, we see developed a corpus of the law of civil liability for
wrongs. As importantly, the combined Graeco-Roman developments created and
bequeathed to modern Western law a taxonomy of civil causes of action, the remedies
therefore, and even various and valuable proto-procedural approaches that inform the
Western law of delict, or tort, to this day. Throughout, in an evolution that most would
describe as progressive, we see (1) the cohering of laws giving security to society; (2) the
movement from vengeance as a remedy to compensation; (3) the identification of a great
array of wrongs for which civil remedies might be sought; (4) the introduction of faultbased liability for certain harms; and (5) the introduction of equity so as to permit the
rendition of justice in circumstances in which existing law or its absence might preclude
it.
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It is recognized commonly that our modern Western law derives linearly from
that of early Greece and early Rome. That “body” of law is sometimes referred to in the
conjunctive as “Graeco-Roman” law, a characterization that does no disservice to history
provided it is accompanied with certain clarifications. As mentioned, the law of early
Greece and the law of early Rome represent distinctive juridical bodies. The law of early
Greece largely but not entirely preceded Roman law, and must be examined as a
particular onto its own. Second, the use of the term “law” itself should be appreciated as
originating almost totally as in myth, transmitted through the poetry and other literature
of the ancients, axioms of conduct offered by wise men, tradition, customs, and a mixture
of each of these. This was true of both the Greek and the Roman experience. Only
eventually would efforts be made to consolidate the norms from these differing sources,
and from the disparate regions of the respective nations, into a written form. In the Greek
experience, the pressure came first from the respective kings, and later from democratic
assemblies. In Rome, the impetus was exclusively imperial.
Analyses of this type have sometimes sought philosophical characterizations of the
law of ancient Greece and that of ancient Rome and its fluid empire. Through imposition
of a modern taxonomy onto cultural-legal norms of these ancients, inquiries have posed
such questions as “Can the law of Rome be characterized as having adopted an approach
of instrumentalism in its senatorial and lesser mandates?”1 There is no fault to be found
in such inquiries. However in my view they reap little benefit, as one can presuppose that

1

See, e.g., Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531 (2005),
in which the authors, writing of in rem jurisdiction, state: “Some conceptualists advance instrumental
reasons for certain ancient rules, but they fail, or do not bother, to explain the institution . . . in its entirety.”
Id. at 535.
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any written law by virtually any society has had and continues to have an objective of
modifying the behavior of those subject to it.2
In the discussion to follow we will encounter examples of civil recourse that will
seem to us today primitive and even barbaric. Indeed it was not until the Third Century
A.D. that Roman Law took a decided turn away from its principal goals sanction and
deterrence and adopted increasingly an emphasis on compensation and rectification.
Throughout, however, we will also find quite progressive forms of dispute resolution,
including many that as modified are today employed throughout civil code and common
law justice systems alike. Particularly as these norms and laws are preserved for us, as
they were for the ancients themselves, in the form of classical literature, we will find law
and logic accompanied by poetry that has on its own merits endured through the ages.
A strictly Roman definition of delict (maleficia) is “acts involving what dominant
opinion regards as wrong, and as [such] the law punished them or allowed them to be
punished on this ground.”3 For the purposes of this article I will approach and describe
delict more narrowly to mean a civil, non-contractual harm.4 This definition is not very
noteworthy, and indeed will be recognized as a standard contemporary definition of
“tort”. In the context of ancient Greek and Roman law, however, there is yet another
benefit to my chosen definition of delict, and it is that in the periods in question there had
2

The exceptions would be quite limited, and would include such rules as bills of attainder or certain ex post
facto laws, and these, in any event, would only be exceptions that test the rule. The former has had as its
typical purpose the punishment of particular individuals or their families, and are not laws of general
applicability. The latter may fail in any test as to whether they operate to correct the behavior of persons
who have already committed the acts that are now proscribed, but yet do operate as a prophylaxis against
the future unwanted behaviors of others.
3
J. DECLAREUIL, ROME TH E LAW GIVER 194-95 (Greenwood, Westport, Ct. 1970)(citing Institutes of
Gaius 3, 181; Institutes of Justinian 4, 1-pr.). Hans Kelsen took the approach of defining any breach of a
legal norm as a delict. M. D. A. FREEMAN, LLOYD’S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed.) 2612
(Sweet and Maxwell 2001).
4
As is evident from the discussion that follows, there was not then, any more than there is today, a
concensus as to just what breaches or wrongs ought properly be characterized as delictual.
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yet to be made the distinction between civil wrongs and certain wrongs that would be
later defined as criminal. The various forms of homicide (intentional, accidental, etc.) or
mayhem or serious battery are the primary examples of this.5
The effect of the absence of a criminal treatment of even intentional homicide in
early Greek and Roman law was that these “crimes” were subject to “civil” trial or other
resolution, that is, a dispute between the victim or his survivors and the perpetrator, rather
than a trial in which the state was the party bringing the action against the alleged actor.
In the descriptions and discussion to follow we will see much corroboration for the
suggestion of Sir Henry Sumner Maine that ancient law is more akin to the law of civil
delict than it is to criminal law.6 Thus the definition of delict as a civil non-contractual
wrong is further refined by the understanding that “civil” means, as pertinent to the times,
only that the action was between private parties, and adjusts without more for the fact that
in the earlier periods of the Grecian and the Roman legal development under discussion,
distinctions had yet to be made between what would today be considered criminal
wrongs, or civil wrongs, but not both.

II.

THE LAW OF ANCIENT GREECE
A. GENERALLY

It is today widely supposed that the ancient Greeks had adopted some organizing
principles of substantive and procedural civil law prior to any written recordation, or at
least any surviving written evidence. Instead, the earliest moments of a Greek political
order sufficient to sustain civil law, or the law relating to resolution of disputes between
5
6

See particularly the Code of Draco and the Code of Solon, described below Part II. D.
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 217 (1861).
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one citizen and another, comes to us in largely literary form. These forms include
Homeric and other poetry, and the historo-literary recitations of the mythological origins
of many ancient norms. To the Greeks, Zeus was the giver of law (dike) to men, and
such laws or norms of behavior (themistes) as were explicit or implicit in the mythical
accounts were described as the gifts of Zeus. It was an age that predated society of
sufficient internal coherence to generate “law” as the product of communal human
deliberation, or even law as the edict of a ruler or rulers with sufficient dominion to have
regal declarations give order to any realm of significance. As importantly, it was also an
age still a captive of the conclusion that phenomena ranging from natural forces to the
consequences of human behavior were guided by edicts of gods and not men.

A. MYTHICAL ORIGINS
For the purposes of this article, a description of early Greek themes of justice and
judging ought naturally precede any description of more particular law. The great poet
Hesiod (~700 B.C.) wrote of the earliest concepts of justice, and recited how at this early
time in Grecian cultural awareness, those who transgressed the will of a god or gods were
answerable not to man but to such god(s). As would be expected, such legal tenets as can
be identified in Greek mythology are revealed in mythic stories or fables, rather than in a
narrative form that contains an “if” clause (the prostasis), and end with a “then” clause
(the apodasis) that is characteristic of law codes.7 Thus the prostasis identifies a

7

RUSS VERSTEEN, EARLY MESOPOTAMEAN LAW 3 (2000)(describing as illustrative the Code of
Hammurabi. In such codes, such as, for example, the Code of Hammurabi, might be c. Thus the prostasis
identifies a circumstance or activity that the lawmakers concluded need a legal rule, while the apodasis
describes the legal consequences the creation of such a circumstance or the engagement in such activity.
See generally M. Stuart Madden, Tort Law Through Time and Culture: Themes of Economic Efficiency,
EXPLORING TORTS 22 (M. Stuart Madden, ed.)(Cambridge 2005).
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circumstance or activity that the lawmakers concluded need a legal rule, while the
apodasis describes the legal consequences the creation of such a circumstance or the
engagement in such activity.8 This approach bears the most significant markings of
code-based law throughout the ages and followed today, while not, of course,
exclusively, throughout the world.
This inquiry will emphasize the contributions of Hesiod, the influential, earliest
and enduring interlocutor for the most ancient concepts of Greek justice. His
contribution is most pronounced for its substantial telling of tales of right, wrong, and the
norms that the ancient Greeks adopted and adapted in their path from diffuse tribal
groupings to the great, if small, Athens. Hesiod was an historian and poet, and his work
survives as authoritative in its recitation (or interpretation) of myth as then subscribed to
by Greeks of his day. He wrote that he would often visit a particular mountain known to
be habitated by the Muses, from whom he took much of his inspiration. The motivation
for his copious treatment normative and proto-delictual concerns has been tied by some
to a story in which Hesiod and his brother were denied justice in a matter of inheritance.
It is in Hesiod’s WORKS AND DAYS that we find the recitation that in Greek
mythology, or more properly, in the beliefs of the ancient Greeks, justice” itself, or
herself, was assigned a place in the pantheon and named “virgin Justice”, who sits beside
her father Zeus.9 It is usually vain to try to identify the first wrong recognized by a
culture, although certain among them seem to invite the effort.10 While Greek mythology
does not insist upon this designation, it does seem as though violence of man against man
8

Id. at 11.
HESIOD, WORKS AND DAYS ll. 248-264, in HESIOD AND THEOGONIS (Dorothy Wender, transl.)(Penguin
1976). Alternative sources of Hesiod’s work are available on search engines such as www.wikipedia.org,
and Project Guttenberg, The translations will vary unimportantly.
10
For example, the “original sin” of the Judeo-Christian BOOK OF GENESIS.
9
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for might well be the “original” proscription, with robbery, deceit and defamation
rounding out the group.
At the earliest of moments, to the mind of the ancient Greek, the gods ordained that
man would occupy an elevated place among living creatures, and that this unique
entitlement was a function of man’s capacity for reason. An early and signal virtue that
such reason made available to man but not to the baser animal inhabitants was his ability
to abstain from violence against other men. It is Cronos, the father of Zeus, who declares
that a singular attribute of man’s elevation over beasts is that man can and should follow
the “right” and foreswear violence.11 Here regarding an injunction of the greatest
generality, to wit, avoid violence, the punishment for man’s departure from Cronos’s
mandate is harsh indeed, as transgressors invite not only their own punishment but also
potentially the punishment of their entire communities.12 This theme of theatrical over
deterrence is repeated throughout the era’s normative presentations.
As is seen similarly in Judeo-Christian scripture, in the mythos of ancient Greece
deceit was the original sin, and it was amply punished by the sovereign god Zeus. The
story as recounted by Hesiod is of a time in which the gods hid from man “the means of
11

WORKS AND DAYS, supra note 9 at ll. 238-247.
But for those who practise violence and cruel deeds far-seeing Zeus, the son of Cronos, ordains a
punishment. Often even a whole city suffers for a bad man who sins and devises presumptuous deeds,
and the son of Cronos lays great trouble upon the people, famine and plague together, so that[T]sh
away, and their women do not bear children, and their houses become few, through the contriving of
Olympian Zeus. And again, at another time, the son of Cronos either destroys their wide army, or their
walls, or else makes an end of their ships on the sea.
***
[T]he son of Cronos has ordained this law for men, that fishes and beasts and winged fowls should
devour one another, for right is not in them; but to mankind he gave right which proves far the best.
For whoever knows the right and is ready to speak it, far-seeing Zeus gives him prosperity; but
whoever deliberately lies in his witness and forswears himself, and so hurts Justice and sins beyond
repair, that man's generation is left obscure thereafter. But the generation of the man who swears truly
is better thenceforward.
HESIOD, WORKS AND DAYS, supra note 9 at ll, 274-285, HESIOD AND THEOGONIS 67 (Dorothy Wender,
transl.)(Penguin 1976).
12
Id.
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life”, and principally, fire, on the logic that with such tools man would provide for
himself in one day enough to sustain him for a year.13 However, the clever Prometheus
stole fire from the gods, with later help from Iapetus, and Zeus, furiously, “planned
sorrow and mischief against men.”14 He bade Hephaesteus to mix earth and water to
make the form of a woman, in a lovely “maiden-shape”, and then instructed Athena and
Aphrodite to weave into the human experience “cruel longing and cares that weary the
limbs.”15
Much of Hesiod’s writing is devoted no so much to mythos as to ethos, which is to
say, it can be understood as a recitation not of fable but rather of extant norms.
References to gods abound even in the absence of a governing myth, for in the absence of
a civil society positioned to enforce proto-legal norms, the Greeks adverted to the power
of gods to smite wrongdoers. Hesiod gives these observations regarding both robbery by
violence and theft by deceit:
Wealth should not be seized: god-given wealth is
much better; for if a man take great wealth violently and
perforce, or if he steal it through his tongue, as often happens
when gain deceives men's sense and dishonour tramples down
honour, the gods soon blot him out and make that man's house low,
and wealth attends him only for a little time.16

Hesiod writes of also of ex ante precautions against later disputes as the prefereable
means of handling money, employment and other matters of business, to the point of
advising persons to secure witnesses for corroboration of agreements as to wages.17

13

The notion of the raw efficiency of such a situation was troubling to the gods, the story relates, as in the
midst of such abundance they predicted that man would put away his oxen and tools and “the fields would
.
run to waste.” HESIOD, WORKS AND DAYS ll. 42-53, in HESIOD AND THEOGONIS, id., at 6.
14
HESIOD, WORKS AND DAYS ll. 42-53, in HESIOD AND THEOGONIS, supra note 9 at 60.
15
HESIOD, WORKS AND DAYS ll. 60-68, in HESIOD AND THEOGONIS, id. at 61.
16
HESIOD, WORKS AND DAYS ll. 320-341, in HESIOD AND THEOGONIS, id. at 68-69.
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Hesiod devotes several passages to the delict of libel and slander, suggesting an
early recognition that traficking in harmful untruths was an invitation to a physical and
even violent response. He advised: “Do not get a name either as lavish or as churlish;
as a friend of rogues or as a slanderer of good men.” 18 When a libel or a slander occurs
in the context of a legal proceeding, what today might be called “false utterance,” not
only is the target of the falsity injured, but Justice herself: Should “virgin Justice”suffer
“hurt” by “lying slander”, Hesiod writes, her report of this to Zeus, together with any
other incidents of “mens’ wicked heart” result in an undesignated retribution.19
3.

Of Judges and Justice

The historian Herodotus, better remembered for his defining history of the
War, also wrote stories of the integrity (or its want) of the earliest judges and the process
of judging. As a starting off point, historian Michael Gagarin chooses Herodotus’s story
of Deices, the first king of Medes.20 As Gagaran relates the story: “Deioce, a wise man . .
. [who] already had a high reputation in his village, . . . practiced dikaiosyne (“justice”) . .
. zealously. There was considerable lawlessness (anomie) throughout the country, and
when the people of Deioces own village observed his qualities. ‘they chose him
(repeatedly) to be their judge.’ Since he was `straight’ (ithys) and `just’ (dikaios)m he

17

“Let the wage promised to a friend be fixed; even with your brother smile -- and get a witness; for trust
and mistrust, alike ruin men.” HESIOD, WORKS AND DAYS ll. 370-372, in HESIOD AND THEOGONIS, supra
note 9 at 70.
18
HESIOD, WORKS AND DAYS ll. 715-716, id. at 82.
19
See also HESIOD, WORKS AND DAYS ll. 717-721: “Never dare to taunt a man with deadly poverty
which eats out the heart; it is sent by the deathless gods. The best treasure a man can have is a sparing
tongue, and the greatest pleasure, one that moves orderly; for if you speak evil, you yourself will soon be
worse spoken of.” Id. at 82.
Of gossip, Hesiod continues, at ll 760-63: “So do: and avoid the talk of men. For Talk is
mischievous, light, and easily raised, but hard to bear and difficult to be rid of. Talk never wholly dies
away when many people voice her: even Talk is in some ways divine.” HESIOD AND THEOGONIS, supra
note 9 at 84.
20
HERODOTUS, 1.96-98, in MICHAEL GAGARIN, EARLY GREEK LAW 20 (U. Cal. 1986).
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rapidly gained a reputation as the only one who judged cases `correctly’ (kata to
orthon).”21 At this stage from what appears a “formal” resolution of a civil dispute
depended upon the agreement of both parties to present their cases to a particular
respected and “straight” man willing to undertake this task.
This premium placed on the rectitude of the judge, be he a patrician or a plebian but a
wise man, is repeated frequently in the literature, and with such a frequency as to suggest
that that the early Greeks were more concerned with false judges than they were with
false idols. In his THEOGONY Hesiod reemphasized the need for the “straight” over the
“crooked” in dispute resolution, admonishing his brother Perces to follow the path of the
“straight” and to avoid the “crooked” (hybris). He warns of the consequences of crooked
judgments, and he employs as a metaphor for the risk to a just society of corrupt judge
the vivid image of justice being dragged of by “gift devouring” (corrupt} kings.22 Not
only would be authors of just resolutions of disputes be rewarded, but also their

21

Id. at 20-21 (references omitted).
But you, Perses, listen to right and do not foster
violence; for violence is bad for a poor man. Even the
prosperous cannot easily bear its burden, but is weighed down
under it when he has fallen into delusion. The better path is to
go by on the other side towards justice; for Justice beats
Outrage when she comes at length to the end of the race. But
only when he has suffered does the fool learn this. For Oath
keeps pace with wrong judgements. There is a noise when Justice
is being dragged in the way where those who devour bribes and
give sentence with crooked judgements, take her. And she,
wrapped in mist, follows to the city and haunts of the people,
weeping, and bringing mischief to men, even to such as have
driven her forth in that they did not deal straightly with her.
HESIOD, THEOGONY ll 213-18, 220-24, in HESIOD, THE THEOGONY (Thomas Cook, transl.)(1740),
available at Literature Online:
http://lion.chadwick.com/searchFultext.do?id=Z00032040&divLevel=0&queryId=&are. . . Searched
August 19. 2005. See also HESIOD AND THEOGONIS, supra note 9 at 30.
Hesiod refers to Perses as his brother, but it is supposed by some that Perses is a literary character
Hesiod has created to be a foil for certain of his dialogues.
22

12

communities, with prosperity and peace.23 Surely no more direct encomium to justice
can be imagined.24
What are the qualities or aptitudes that permit a man or a ruler to not only do
justice fairly but also have the parties and the populace concur in the (overall) fairness of
the justice dispensed? Hesiod is content to explain that a King’s skill in resolving
disputes turns upon the with the favor of the Muses. If a King has been so favored,
“soothing words flow from his mouth.” Hesiod continues: “And he, speaking surely,
quickly and intelligently puts an end to even a great dispute. Therefore there are
intelligent kings, in order that in the agora [public meeting place] they may easily restore
matters for people who have suffered damages, persuading them with gentle words.”25
A third and final example of dispute resolution is from the Illiad, found in the trial scene
on Achilles shield. The dispute is over a killing, for which a reparation has been offered
but rejected, and the disputants have brought the matter for argument before a public
forum for settlement:
A crowd, then, in a market place, and there
Two men at odds over satisfaction owed
For a murder done: one claimed that all was paid,
And publicly declared it; his opponent
Turned the reparation down, and both
Demanded a verdict from an arbiter,
As people clamored in support of each,
And criers restrained the crowd. The town elders
23

[T]hey who give straight judgements to strangers
and to the men of the land, and go not aside from what is just,
their city flourishes, and the people prosper in it: Peace, the
nurse of children, is abroad in their land, and all-seeing Zeus
never decrees cruel war against them..
HESIOD, WORKS AND DAYS ll 225-37, in HESIOD AND THEOGONIS, supra note 9 at 30.
24
Conversely, judges, princes and others who author corrupt justice are reminded that the “deathless gods”
are omnipresent and alknowing, and should there be evidence of tainted justice that “oppress their fellows”
. . . “the people [will] pay for the mad folly of their princes who, evilly minded, pervert judgement and give
sentence crookedly.” HESIOD, WORKS AND DAYS ll 248-264, id. at 31.
25
HESIOD, THEOGONY 11.84-90, in HESIOD AND THEOGONIS, id. at 25-26.
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Sat in a ring, on chairs of polished stone,
The staves [skeptra] of clarion criers in their hands,
With which they sprung up, each to speak in turn,
And in the middle were two golden measures
To be awarded to him whose argument
Would be the most straightforward.26

Often the means and the effect of the settlement of a dispute could be as revealing
of the underlying dignitary norms they might would be of the strictly compensatory
matter. In the CATALOGUE OF WOMEN, dated as early as 580 B.C., and attributed,
perhaps erroneously, to Hesiod, there is the story of Sysiphus’s payment of Aithion of
money and cattle to take Aithion’s daughter, Mestra, as his bride. After going to
Sysiphus’s home, the daughter thinks the better of the arrangement and returns to her
father. Sysyphus demands the return of either Mestra of his cattle. The dispute is lain
before a goddess, and the poem relates: “And straightaway strife and dipute arose
between Sysiphus and Aithon over the slim-ankled girl. No mortal was able to judge the
case, and so they referred it to a goddess. And she unerringly settled the matter.” In the
course of deciding the dispute, the goddess is credited with describing the applicable
norm: “[W]hen one wishes to recover the price one has paid for something [without
giving up the object],” one must lose both the object and the payment, “for once payment
is made, it cannot be reclaimed.”27 In analyzing this story Gagarin references authority
suggesting that the goddess’s resolution reflects an implicit conclusion that “Sysiphus
was trying to use Mestra for the same purpose as Aithon was, namely cheating others out
of a sale, so he rightly loses both her and the cattle.”28 Further to the theme of love’s

26

HOMER, THE ILLIAD 18.497-508 (Robert Fitzgerald, trans)(Garden City, N.Y. 1974).
HESIOD, CATALOGUE OF WOMEN frag. 43a31-40, available at
.
28
GAGARIN, supra note 20 at 36 n. 1, referencing J.T. Kakridis, Mestra: zu Hesiods frg. 43a M-W, ZPE 1825 (1975).
27
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labors lost, a recitation from myth assigned to Hesiod and Acusilaus, and involving the
seduction by Zeus of Io, the daughter of Peiren, makes clear that pursuant to the mythic
norm, at least, there should be no “heart balm” remedy for a disappointed suitor.29
A core theme of many mythic dispute resolutions was seemingly the need to (1)
repose in an individual the authority to resolve a dispute in order that the agitated
disputants not resort to self help. In so proceeding, it was accepted that the decision
maker was enjoined to hear both disputants before entering a judgment.30 In THE ILIAD
Book 2 we read the take of the chariot race. Emulus, who was in actuality the fastest
charioteer, comes in last, due to the intervention of Athena. Achilles at first proposes to
give Eumelus second prize, to rectify the wrong done to him, leaving Diomedes, the
actual first place winner, with his first place prize. All are content save Antilochus, who
had finished second in actuality, and who proposes to Achilles that the order of finishing
remain as it was in fact, and that the compensation due Emulus be his award of a special
prize as “the best man in the race.”31 It is a result that in the finest Aristotelian logic
“makes straight” a wrong, and in not dislodging either Diomedes or Antilochus from their
true order of finish, is probably also Pareto Optimal.32

29

AEGIMIUS, Fragment #3, Apollodorus, ii. 1.3.1:
Hesiod and Acusilaus say that she (Io) was the daughter of Peiren. While
she was holding the office of priestess of Hera, Zeus seduced her, and
being discovered by Hera, touched the girl and changed her into a white cow,
while he swore that he had no intercourse with her. And so Hesiod says that
oaths touching the matter of love do not draw down anger from the gods: `And
thereafter he ordained that an oath concerning the secret deeds of the Cyprian
should be without penalty for men.
Available at
.
30
“Decide no suit until you have heard both sides speak.”, from THE PRECEPTS OF CHIRON Fragment #2 -Plutarch Mor. 1034 E:
Available at
.
31
HOMER, THE ILIAD Book 23, verses 287-351, supra note 26 at 458-465 (Richard Lattimore, trans.)(U.
Chicago 1967).
32
A rule is Pareto optimal when its effects benefit all parties, in essence, a win-win proposition. See
MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 49
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C.

PHILOSOPHICAL EXEGESIS

As lay speakers for a philosophical epoch of greater significance than any other,
the Hellenist philosophers defined virtue, morality and ethics in terms that remain the
bedrock of Western philosophy. Putting aside only a few proponents of distracting
philosophic anomalies, the Greek philosophers first identified an ideal of individual
behaviors that accented study, modesty in thought and deed, and respect of law.
Secondly, the Hellenist thinkers envisioned a society (at that point a city state) of
harmony, accepted strata of skill and task, and, naturally again, respect of law.
The Hellenist image of a society and its individual participants was one of
harmony, rewards in the measure of neither more nor less than one’s just deserts, and
subordination to law. Even as it is recognized generally that a democracy better fulfills
the goals of a just, a moral, and an efficient polity, for a pre-democratic ideal, evaluated
in recognition of its era, measures up respectably.
Hints of the political circumstances in which Stoics found themselves can be
found in the graphics handed down to us from antiquity that portray the various
philosophers either speaking to small groups or, from all that appears, to no one at all.
There are no representations of them speaking in political groups, or advising political
representatives. The reason for this seeming isolation of the philosophers from the
political process is that by the time much of much of the most enduring work of the most
influential Greek philosophers, political power in the Greek mainland had passed over to
the Macedonians. This political powerlessness necessarily affected the focus of many of

(1996). For a general description of Pareto optimality principles, see generally ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW
AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE (1990).
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the philosophers. As Bertrand Russell explained, with the imposition of Macedonian rule,
“Greek philosophers, as was natural, turned aside from politics and devoted themselves
more to the problem of individual virtue and salvation. They no longer asked: how can
men create a good state? They asked instead: how can men be virtuous in a wicked
world, or happy in a world of suffering.”33
Russell’s observation, true to a point, proves too much, as the writings of the
philosophers of that era cannot be cabined so severely. Indeed, when writing not of
virtue but instead, or also, of government in general or law in particular, Hellenist
thinkers turned directly to such themes as (1) the justification underlying the
identification and imposition of law governing civil and other wrongs; (2) the proper
forum for and conduct of law givers; and (3) the essential justice of certain remedies for
particular wrongs.

1..THE JUSTIFICATION FOR IMPOSITION OF LAW GOVERNING WRONGS
Socrates ( 399 B.C. -

) commended abidance of existing law, a commitment

that ultimately led to his rejection of opportunities to flee his death sentence. To the
Thinker, a life of virtue and ethics could only be sustained in a secure, orderly and law
abiding society.
Hellenist thinking cannot be reduced to the aphorism “virtue is its own reward.”
Rather, there were specific rewards associated with a life of virtue, as well as real or
imagined disincentives to the adoption of a baser life and the collateral degrading pursuits
associated therewith. Time and time again the philosophers stated that a life of excess, be
it eating, drinking or both, incapacitated the actor from realization of the contributions
33

BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 230 (1945).
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available to and expected of citizen’s of virtue.34 To both Plato and Socrates, the just
man would be content, if not happy, and the unjust man miserable.35 In addition, and
more specifically, such excesses invited physical illness and impairment, a certain
departure from God’s, or a god’s, charge to mankind. To employ only two examples
from Socrates: (1) The entire structure of Socrates’ ethics is permeated by the principle of
avoidance of doing harm36; and (2) in parts of his lectures Socrates hypothesizes that
perhaps the identifying marker of all acts of “justice” were simply “returning what was
owed”.37
In Plato’s version of Socrates’ words, individual good and justice were, in fact,
profitable. The point could not be put more plainly is Socrates were to be described as so
stating, and indeed Socrates states just this:38 “On what ground, then, can we say that it is
profitable for a man to be unjust or self indulgent or to do any disgraceful act which will
make him a worse man, though he can gain money and power?” Happiness and profit
inure to the man who, alternatively, “tame[s] the brute” within, and is “not be carried
away by the vulgar notion of happiness being heeping up an unbounded tore[,]” but
instead follows the rule of wisdom and law encouraging “support to every member of the
community, and also of the government of children[.]”39

34

To Protagoras Socrates spoke of the physical dangers of excess, stating that “pleasure for the moment …
lay[s] up for your future life diseases and poverty, and many other similar evils[.]” PLATO’S LYSIS, in
SOCRATIC DISCOURSE BY PLATO AND XENOPHON 288 (J. Wright transl., A.D. Lindsay, ed. 1925).
35
ANTHONY GOTTLEIB, THE DREAM OF REASON: A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPOHY FROM THE GREEKS TO THE
RENNASANCE 164 (2000).
36
Id. at 164.
37
Id. at 159-160.
38
39

THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 318-320 (Francis McDonald Cornford, transl.)(1969).
Id.
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Less well known than his other major works, in THE LAWS Plato(428 – 347
B.C.)40 created a didalogue between three speakers, each elderly: an unnamed Athenian,
Clinias, a Cretan, and Megillus, a Spartan. He wrote in a time when public law, or
legislation, was distinguished from private law, but within private law, no clear line
existed between delict and crime. Plato believed that in the main man desired to do what
was right, but that he needed guidance as to what “right” was, and encouragement to
pursue it. Accordingly, in THE LAWS Plato expanded upon the simple recitation of legal
or moral imperatives by giving to the different sections of his “specimen” laws discussion
that included both “direction and encouragement” to the audience,41 including Plato’s
view of what constituted the worthier choices a man might make.
In THE LAWS Plato does not essay to write comprehensively of his view of an
ideal corpus of law, and indeed there is no showing that aspired to such. Rather, as he
surely intended it, as a treatise accessible to the quite literate Athenian population from
which could be drawn representative examples of rules of conduct and the reasons
therefore. For what not included, we can only suppose that the author intended that the
organizing ethic revealed therein would encourage right-minded people to make the
correct choices, guided by ethics if not law.42
To Plato’s mind, many of the wrongs to which man might be drawn did not even
need the attention of the law. Incest, for example, was within a class of wrongs so base
that acculturated norms alone should suffice to eliminate it.43 Regarding obligations that

40

PLATO, THE LAWS (A.E. Taylor, transl.)(Everyman, 1966).
Id. at xv.
42
For the distinction between ethics, and acting from ethics, and law, see notes
below and
accompanying text.
43
Ath: Well, then, you see how all such lusts are extinguished by a mere phrase.
Meg.: Phrase? What phrase?
41
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were, in contrast, suited to external obligations, Plato placed several rules that might
represent tort-property or tort-contract hybrids under the rubric of Agriculture. Here the
Athenian suggests a statute that would forbid the moving of a neighbor’s landmark, be
the neighbor friend or foe. He adds ominously that one violating this rule risks the wrath
of Zeus, the “protector of the stranger to the other[.]. . .” 44
Plato warns against “little repeated torts between neighbors” that might created ill
will.45 Persons will be held strictly liable to others for personal harm or invasion of
property.46 Throughout THE LAWS Plato’s Athenian describes a regimen in which the
ownership rights to land are protected as sedulously as they would come to be in English
law a millennium later in its laws of trespass and nuisance. One working the soil of
another “shall make the damage god to him, and shall moreover, by way of medicine for
his churlish behavior, pay a further sum of double the amount of the damage to the
sufferer.”47 For the creation of a nuisance such as the planting of trees in too close a
proximity to the land of another, the actor must pay such a fine as is set by the
magistrate.48 For some wrongs to land, Plato’s Athenian seems to introduce an element
of culpa. Thus the man who “in making a bonfire . . . take[s] no precaution for the timber
of his neighbor’s land” must likewise pay the fine imposed.49 With regard to the

Ath: The saying that they are all unhallowed, abominations to God, deeds of black shame. The
explanation must surely be that no one holds a different language about them; all of us, from our
very cradles, are hearing the same report of them from all quarters[.]. . .
PLATO, THE LAWS, id. at 224.
44
Id. at 230.
45
Id. at 231.
46
“[N]eighbor must take every care to do nothing exceptional to neighbor; must keep himself strictly from
all such acts, and above all from encroachment on a neighbor’s lands[.]” Id. at 231.
47
PLATO, THE LAWS 231 (A.E. Taylor, transl.)(Everyman, 1966).
48
Id. .
49
Id. .
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conversion of personal property, such as the “humouring” of the bees on one owner’s
land so that they migrate to the other’s property, he must pay damages.50
Plato returns repeatedly to the issue of water in terms of its potential for damaging
the land of another. He describes the duties of landowners both to others possessing land
either higher in gradient or lower to their own. To his up gradient neighbor the
landowner owed a duty not to impede the outflow of rainwater; to the down gradient
neighbor a duty not to cause damage “by careless discharge of the efflux” from the higher
property. In the event of a breach of these obligations, an affected neighbor might seek
an order from a magistrate directing the appropriate party to commence compliance.51
In his TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT Aristotle recognizes that absent a circumstance
in which “we suppose a set of people to live separate from each other . . . and that there
were laws subsisting between each party, to prevent their injuring one another[,]” they
still require, for those instances in which commerce requires that they aggregate in one
place, “alliances subsisting between each party to mutually assist and prevent any injury.”
It is noteworthy that Aristotle writes here of “alliances”, or agreements, and to
“prevent[ing]” harm, as distinct from providing remedies for harm that has already
occurred. This suggestion of the potential superiority of ex ante agreements permitting
accords between neighbors before disputes may arise will be evident anew in Roman law
codes and their several and copious interpretations.52

2. THE PROPER FORUM FOR AND CONDUCT OF “LAW GIVERS”

50

Id.
PLATO, THE LAWS, supra note 40 at 232 (A.E. Taylor, transl.)(Everyman, 1966) Again, the Athenian
suggests that liability is not strict, but instead applies only to “careless discharge”.
52
See notes
below and accompanying text.
51
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As had Hesiod before him, Aristotle deliberated at length regarding the proper
forum for and conduct of “law givers”. To Aristotle, great moral responsibility attaches
those who would so organize a city that is prepared to live under the rule of law;
“[W]hosoever endeavours to establish wholesome laws in a state, attends to the virtues
and the vices of each individual who composes it; from whence it is evident, that the first
care of him who would found a city . . . must be to have his citizens virtuous[.] . . . [L]aw
is an agreement and a pledge, as the sophist Lycophron says, between the citizens of their
intending to do justice to each other, though not sufficient to make all the citizens just
and good[.]”53
Aristotle wrote of the application of unwritten law when he referenced the
approach taken by the Ephors of Sparta “using their own judgement.”54 Again, as Hesiod
had ascribed to Muses his inspiration for many of his statements of law, so too does a
figure in Aristotle’s account of early law, an unlikely law giver, Zaleucus, a shepard.
Aristotle wrote: “[W]hen the Locians asked the oracle how they might find relief from
the considerable turmoil they were experiencing, the oracle responded that they should
have laws enacted for themselves, whereupon a certain Shepard named Zaleucus
ventured to propose to the citizens many excellent laws, When they learned of these and
asked him where he had found them, he replied that Athena had come to him in a
dream.”55 It appears that attribution of early law to the intervention of a god or a goddess
was not unusual, and perhaps served to lend weight to the instructive power of any law
thus derived. In analogous stories the Cretans assigned the origins of certain laws to the
53

ARISTOTLE: A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT Bk. , Chapt. (William Ellis, A.M., transl.)(J.M. Dent. &
Soncs, Ltd. 1928), available at
.
54
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS BOOK III, l.1270 B 30, at 578 (Ernest Barker, trans.)(Oxford:Clarendon 1946).
55
F.E. Adcock, Literary Tradition and Early Greek Code-Makers, 2 CAMB. HIST. J. 95 (1927), referenced
in GAGARIN, supra note 20 at 57.
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mythic figure Minos and others, while the Spartans believed that Lycurgas’s laws came
from the Delphic oracle.56

3. THE ESSENTIAL JUSTICE OF CERTAIN REMEDIES FOR PARTICULAR WRONGS
External law may coerce or induce man to act in accordance thereto. Ethics, in
contrast, comprise “laws for which external legislation is impossible”.57 Ethics concerns
man’s act, or omission to act, and by the exercise of his free will or choice, not
infurtherance of external legislation but rather pursuant to mans’ “will as its [ethics’]
objects and aims. … [pursuant to] the free choice of the individual.” 58
Returning what was owed, in effect giving up the actual or conceptual unjust
enrichment associated with a wrongful taking, is of course part and parcel to the analysis
of Aristotle, in NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS Book V, ch. 2 , in which “The Thinker” is
credited with laying the cornerstone of the corrective justice principles of today's
common law,59 although the logic has equivalent bearing upon economic considerations.
Under the Aristotelian principle of diorthotikos, or "making straight," at the remedy
phase the court will attempt to equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away from
the gain of the wrongrdoer. Whether the wrongdoer’s gain is monetary, or measured in
property, or the community’s valuation of a personal physical injury consequent to the
defendant’s wrongful act, by imposing a remedy approximating the actor’s wrongful

56

PLATO, THE LAWS, supra note 40 at 624A-625A.
T.E. HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 27 (11th ed)(1910).
58
Id. (citations omitted).
59
“[T]he law . . . treats the parties as equal, and asks only if one is the author and the other the victim of
injustice or if the one inflicted and the other has sustained an injury. Injustice in this sense is unfair or
unequal, and the endeavor of the judge is to equalize it.” ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 154
(J. Welldon trans., 1987), discussed in David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40
Ala. L. Rev. 705, 707-08 & n.6 (1989). See alternatively ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book ,
ll. , in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE (Richard McKeon, ed.)(Modern Library 1947)
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appropriation and “loss” to the sufferer, “the judge restores equality . . . .”60 This justice
should be meted out equivalently to all, irrespective of whether the sufferer is a good man
or a bad one. 61 As Book V Chapter 4 is paraphrased by Joachim: “If, for example, the
thief was a gentleman and the injured party a beggar - - a member of an inferior class in
the state - - this difference of rank is nothing to the law. . . . All that the law is concerned
with is that, of two parties before it, one has got an unfair advantage and the other has
suffered an unfair disadvantage. There is, therefore, a wrong which needs redress - - an
inequality which needs to be equalized.”62
Aristotle classified among the divers “involuntary” transactions that would invite
rectification “clandestine” wrongs, including “theft, adultery, poisoning, . . . false
witness[;]” and “violent” wrongs, including “assault, imprisonment, . . . robbery with
violence, . . . abuse, [and] insult.”

63

Importantly, Aristotle does not promise distributive

justice, in the sense that a man may remedy his antecedent unequal position vis a vis
another.64 Rather, corrective justice will only work to rectify the marginal inequality that
the wrongdoing has imposed.65
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“[T]he judge tries to equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away the gain of the assailant.
For the term “gain” [kerdos] is applied generally to such cases - - even if it is not a term appropriate to
certain cases , e.g., to the person who inflicts the wound - - and “loss” [zemia] to the sufferer; at all events,
when the suffering has been estimated, the one is called loss and the other gain . . . Therefore the just . . .
consists in having an equal amount before and after the suffering.”
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2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 786 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
62
SAUL LEVMORE, FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 60 (1993).
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To Aristotle:
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PRIMITIVE, ARCHAIC AND MODERN ECONOMIES: ESSAYS OF KARL POLANYI 96 (George Dalton,
ed.)(1968).
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Aristotle understanding corrective justice to enable restoration to the victim of the
status quo ante major, insofar as a monetary award or an injunction can do so.66
Importantly, he proceeds to distinguish between excusable harm and harm for which
rectification my appropriately be sought. For an involuntary harm, such as when “A
takes B’s hand and therewith strikes C[,]” nor “within [A’s] power[,]” or for acts
pursuant to “ignorance”, a more nuanced legal response is indicated.67 Even for such
involuntary acts as “violat[e] proportion or equality”, Aristotle suggests opaquely, some
should be excused, while others should not be excused.68
In his hypothetical laws, Aristotle’s writings presage distinctions that will
eventually form the basis for dividing absolute liability from innocent causing of harm.
As to voluntary and harmful acts attributable to ignorance, Aristotle distinguishes
between acts acts in which the ignorance is excusable and acts in which the ignorance is
not.69 The former, which we might today characterize as innocent, would not prompt
remediation, while the latter would. Thus Aristotle describes an act from which injury
results “contrary to reasonable expectation” as a “misadventure”, and forgivable at law.70
To Aristotle, an unintentional act71 that causes harm, but where such harm “is not
contrary to reasonable expectation[,]” constitutes not a misadventure but a “mistake”.
To Aristotle, “mistake” is a fault based designation. The example used is redolent of

“[A]wards should be made “according to merit”; for all men agree that what is just in distribution
must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify the same sort of merit,
but democrats identify it with the status of the freemen, supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or
noble birth) and supporters of aristocracy with excellence.”
66
“Therefore the just is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of loss, viz, those which are
involuntary; it consists in having an equal amount before and after the transaction.” Ch. 4, id. at 407.
67
ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS CH. 8, supra note 63 at 414.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS CH. 8, supra note 63 at 415.
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An act that “does not imply vice[.]” Id.
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what would be termed “negligence” in today’s nomenclature: a man throwing an object
“not with intent to wound but only to prick[.]” This man, although not acting with an
intent to wound another in any significant way, would nonetheless be subject to an
obligation in indemnity, for to Aristotle, when “a man makes a mistake[;]. . . the fault
originates in him[.]”72

D. THE CODES OF SOLON AND OTHERS
With the end of the hereditary monarchy, political power in Greece passed to the
nobility, who in turn sat in the Supreme Council of State on a hill known as Areopagus.
Administration of the law was vested in magistrates, all of whom were drawn from the
nobility. The law that was in fact administered was customary law, and indeed the Greek
73

for law was nomos, or custom.

It was largely unwritten, and as its divination,

articulation and application rested in the noble classes, the lower classes viewed it with
and understandable mistrust.
It is probable that the Greeks began to inscribe their laws in the middle of the
Seventh Century, B.C. In about 621 B.C., in response to popular turmoil, the nobility
agreed to reduce customary law to writing, and produced the first Greed written legal
code, the Code of Dracon. Draco was Greece’es first law scribe, at the time he enjoyed
the position of archon eponymous. Draco’s law concerning homicide, variously 620 or
621 B.C. set exile as the penalty, and included other provisions such as pertain to the
seeking of a pardon and the protection of the perpetrator from retaliation by the victim’s

72
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See generally Kathleen Freeman, Legal Code and Procedure, in J. C. SMITH, DAVID N. WEISSTUB, THE
WESTERN IDEA OF LAW 296 (Butterworths 1983).
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family.74 It provided: “Even if a man unintentionally kills another, he is exiled. The
kings are to adjudge responsible for the homicide either the killer or the planner[.] . . .If
anyone kills the killer or is responsible for his death, as long as he stays away from the
frontier markets, games and Amphictyonic sacrifices, he shall be liable to the same
treatment as the one who kills and Athenian[.] . . . It is allowed to kill or arrest killers, if
they are caught in the territory. . . . If a man defending himself straightaway kills
someone forcibly and unjustly plundering or seizing him, the killer shall pay no
penalty.”75 A borrower in default could be sold into slavery if his social status was less
than his lender.76
Zaleucus and Charondas undertook to set down in written form penalties for other
delicts, surely a valuable endeavor to the extent that it would serve to lessen the then
extant uncertainty of results at the penalty phase of a dispute. Charondas differentiated
“minutely” the numerous types of assaults,77 but such was the tenor of the time, as
Aristotle relates the “lawgiving” endeavors of others as incidental and not collectively
significant.[78] 79

74
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In its employment of the penalty of death for a wide range of offenses, even for
offenses as minor as petty theft, Draco’s code, even as revised, was extraordinarily harsh
by today’s standards - whither today’s expression of “Draconian” as an equivalent of
“harsh”. Even not so very long after its era, Aristotle wrote dismissively of the
significance of Draco’s codification, characterizing it merely as derivative and harsh. 80 In
Draco’s defense, though, his charge was not to reform the law, but rather to codify
existing customary law, and that he did.

81

Nevertheless, as Greek cultural mores evolved, an ever increasing number of
Greeks concluded that Dacon’s Code in written form betrayed a harshness that invited, if
not demanded reform, and the task of the first major revision fell to Solon, who was
appointed to the task in 594 B.C.82 He was given one year to reform the Athenian
constitution, as well as its legal code, and its law courts.83
Under the laws of Solon, the penalty for rape was 100 drachmas.84 The penalties
for theft depended upon the value of the goods stolen.85 Penalties were also imposed for
libel,86 and for a favorite topic of students of common law tort, the dog bite. For the
lattermost, the penalty was the giving over of the dog, with the dog wearing a large
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wooden collar.87 In one provision that would suggest revision of the established legal
maxim de minimus non curat lex, Solon’s laws contained a penalty for conversion of
cow dung.88
Solon’s law also contained regulations regarding matters that would today sound
in nuisance, including rules for the minimum distances between homes, and the
permissible interposition of walls, ditches, wells, beehives, and certain trees.89
Demosthenes contains an account of one such dispute involving one neighbor’s claim of
damage arising from the placement of a wall on his neighbor’s property.90 Solon’s
revisions also introduced the jury court (heliaca), which came to be employed in most
disputes save shoes involving bloodshed and arson. The juries reached remarkable
numbers, some as large as 500 members, although the law provided that any number be
uneven in order to preclude a tie. The jury would be the finder of fact in accordance with
the applicable law, at which point, if the finding was one of guilt or responsibility, the
law provided for the penalty. Jurors swore to hear both sides of a dispute impartially, but
after that, the trials themselves could be extraordinary affairs in which litigants and jurors
might end up in shouting matches, showing behavior more like today’s town meeting
than a modern trial.91
Thus from the time of Solon’s revisions onward, the law applied in Greek courts
was the Code of Solon, as it might be amended or clarified from time to time by decree of
the Assembly of the People. In order to preclude casual alteration or repeal of the Code,
87
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a specific and laborious procedure was followed for any proposed changes.92 In the end,
however, the laws of the Greek “democracy” could not under any circumstances fulfill
the ideal of Kantian social contract theory. That social contract theory in particular
contemplates “the idea of society as a system of cooperation between free and equal
persons[.]”93 And Greece, for its advances in the democratic ideal, never freed itself
from the restrictions of slavery and status based upon land ownership and gender.

III.

ROMAN LAW
A. EARLY ROMAN LAW

It is received wisdom that together with Anglo-American common law, Roman law is
one of the two foundations of the civil law now observed throughout much of the
Western world.94 The law today characterized as Roman Law had its sources in statutes,
plebicites,95 constitutions, and praetorian orders, among other stimuli. However, as J.
Declareuil points out: “The most ancient law was entirely customary.”96 The pronounced
and continuing effect of customary law was recognized in theistic and secular societies
alike. In the earliest Roman Law codification, that of the Twelve Tables, we see the
92
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greatest incidence of rules that reflect the norms of an agricultural society. These rules
must, of course, make provision for the protection of the individual and family from the
wrongful interruption of others with their personal safety and the preservation of their
property. Due, if preliminary, attention is also given to subjects that pertain to the
preservation of individual rights against the potential predations of the wealthier, landed
and more politically powerful nobility. Finally, early Roman Law sets forth a framework
of proscriptions and penalties for the types of conflicts that would be predictable in the
agricultural setting, which is to say, protection of crops and livestock.
While early Greek law evidenced the textures of philosophy and jurisprudence to
which its famous philosophers contributed, Roman law was practical and elementary.97
After much public pressure for a compilation and rationalization of the disparate sources
of law as enforced by the consuls, in 451 B.C. a commission of 10 jurists (Decemviri)
was appointed to consolidate the laws. Within a year they produced 10 “Tables”, and
then, upon reappointment, wrote the additional two tables, constituting together the
famous “Twelve Tables”. It is uncertain to what extent the Twelve Tables were a
simple, if for the first time coordinated, exposition of customary law, or whether they
reflected a reform reflecting the a need to reconcile customary law with new Republican
constitutional authority. Nor is there any clear reflection within the Twelve Tables of any
purposeful endeavor to adopt the progressive jurisprudence of Greece or any other of its
neighbors.98
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Under Roman law of this early era, criminal and delictual wrongs were most often
correlative, but of course distinguishable. An array of delicts included some prohibitions
which tracked religious or patriarchal values, and still others relying in whole or in part
upon legend.99 For the fluidity of the concept of delict, in Rome as was true as well in
Greece, civil wrongs or maleficia were “acts involving what dominant opinion regarded
as wrong, and the law punished them on this ground.”100 R. W. Lee summarized the
Roman Law of delict in words that resonate in today’s law of tort: “A few simple
principles covered the whole ground, and adopted in modern codes, have been found
sufficient to provide for the complexities of modern life. A man must see that he does
not willfully invade another’s right, or, in breach of a duty, willfully or carelessly cause
him pecuniary loss. If he does either of these things, he is answerable in damages.”101

B. THE TWELVE TABLES
The Twelve Tables, dated at approximately 450 B.C., represent the Roman’s first
recorded effort at a comprehensive recitation of existing customary and nascent statutory
law. It was reduced originally to 12 wooden tablets, and as these, together with the
original language were lost in episodic conflict with the Celts, even the most ancient of
the surviving were doubtless modernized.102
The Italic community that generated the ambitious Twelve Tables was in no sense
egalitarian. Political power and the ownership of land resided in the nobility (patricii),
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from whose ranks were drawn the knights (equites) of the Roman army. Below these
were the common people (plebs), who tended to such land of the nobility as was not
attended to by the sons of the nobility or their slaves. Such land as was not so allotted
would be occupied by plebs, who in return for this generosity were by law cliens of the
nobility and obligated to take arms at the behest of their patricii. Plebs could not marry
patricii, could not hold state office, and could not occupy the priesthood.103
The actual writing of the Twelve Tables was undertaken by an elite group of
jurists, patricians of course, called decemvirs. They presented ten tables of laws,
inscribed most probably on wood but perhaps on bronze. Within a short while it was
concluded that the work fell short of the comprehensive treatment desired, and a second
group of decemvirs, this one including plebian representation, was appointed. This
second group prepared the final two tables.
In the Twelve Tables the legislators did not dedicate themselves to the description
of civil government, as might the drafters of a constitution. Rather, they essayed “to
codify the ius civile, i.e., those rules which were applicable to the rights and duties of the
individual citizen, but to do so as completely as possible.104 For its plentiful strengths
and limitations, the Twelve Tables gave a written unity Roman law that would last for
hundreds of years. Cicero (106-43 B.C.), of whom more is said below, noted the
continuing primacy and influential potency of the Twelve Tables as a resource among
students of the law, lawyers and jurists.
In early Rome, slavery existed, but in no means at the robust level as would be
manifest in a later epoch. As Kunkel relates: “The unfree serf ate the same bread as his
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master, and at the same table, and was protected against personal inury by a statutory
compensation of half the amount prescribed for the case of a free man[.]”105
With only incidental variations, the Twelve Tables represented an absorbtion
prior customary law. It was not coincidental that the consolidation of that customary law
into written form corresponded inexactly with the Roman community’s ascension, in
terms of size, political organization and legal structure, so as to permit it to publish law
and provide mechanisms for its enforcement. The lack of coincidence is attributable to
these two truths held generally to be necessary, but neither in themselves sufficient,
predicates of law. First, to be considered law, be it private or public, the norms thus
published must be rules of generally applicability as to the population cohorts to which
they purport to be applicable. Second, the law must be accompanied by the means of its
application and enforcement. As to this latter proposition, at the time of the TWELVE
TABLES and at other junctures in the law of early Rome, the populace certainly welcomed
the effect that codification would have on arbitrary and unpredictable actions by the
judges. At the same time, they showed no great alacrity in abandoning the sum total of
the tradition-based prerogatives, including the rights of blood vengeance and retaliation.
This was particularly so in the early years in which the consolidation of families, kinships
groups, freed men and slaves was yet to assume the size that would permit it to assume
the responsibility of ensuring just resolution of disputes, or even, for that matter, defend
its own borders.
THE LAWS OF THE TWELVE TABLES, Table II, Concerning Judgments and Thefts,
is sufficiently concise as to invite setting it out in full:.

105

Id. at 8, referencing TWELVE TABLES, VIII. 3.

34

Law IV. Where anyone commits a theft by night, and having b een caught in the
act is killed, he is legally killed.
Law V If anyone commits a theft during the day, and is caught in the act, he
shall be scourged, and given up as a slave to the person against whom the theft was
committed. If he who committed the theft is a slave, he shall be beaten with rods and
hurled from the Tarpeian Rock. If he is under the age of puberty, the praetor shall decide
whether he shall be scourged and surrendered by way of reparation for the injury.
Law VI. When any persons commit a theft during the day and the light, whether
they be freemen oro slaves, of full age or minors, and attempt to defend themselves with
weapons, or with any kind of implements; and the party agains whom the violence is
committed, raises the cry of thief, and calls upon other persons, if any are present, to
come to his assistance; and this is done, and the thieves are killed in the defence of his
person and property, it is legal and no liability attaches to the homicide.
Law VII. If a theft be detected by means of a dish and a girdle, it is the same as
manifest theft, and shall be punished as such.
Law VIII, Whenever anyone accuses and convicts another of theft which is not
manifest, and no stolen property is found, judgment shall be rendered to compel the thief
to pay double the value of what was stolen.
Law IX.

Where anyone secretly cuts down trees belonging to another, he shall

pay 25 asses for each tree cut down.
Law X.

Where anyone, in order to favour a thief, makes a compromise for the

loss sustained, he cannot afterwards prosecute him for theft.
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Law XI. Stolen property shall always be his to whom it formerly belonged; nor
can the lawful owner ever be deprived of it by long possession, without regard to its
duration; nor can it ever be acquired by another, no matter in what way this may take
place.106
As was true of the Greeks,107 at the time Roman legislators turned their attention
to the TWELVE TABLES, there existed no complete distinction between civil and criminal
transgressions. The TWELVE TABLES were intended principally to consolidate
comprehensively, and in written form, the ius civile, thought traditionally as an endeavor
at “safeguarding . . . the small man in particular against the arbitrary behavior of the
patrician nobility in legal relations and the administration of justice.”108 Specific
measures follow largely the form of other ancient and modern codifications, i.e., a
predicate act or omission is identified by a description beginning with the word that can
be translated as “If”, then the act or the omission is described, and finally the legal
consequences thereof.109 After this, and despite the brevity of the sentences, lack of
clarity pervades, with frequent ambiguity in the subject and the object of the chosen verb
form.110
The rustic form of early Roman law contained no provisions for the compulsory
attendance of the defendant, and accordingly, the TWELVE TABLES described a protocol
that the plaintiff was obliged to follow. As translated: “If [plaintiff] summons
[defendant] to law, and if [defendant] does not go, [plaintiff shall call up witnesses. Then
106
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[plaintiff] shall seize [defendant] If [defendant] resists [plaintiff]shall lay hands on (seize)
him. If sickness or age is a weakness, [plaintiff shall provide a beast to carry
[defendant].”111
As Kunkel suggests, it is in many of the particular provisions of the TWELVE
TABLES that the role of the code in Early Rome’s “cultural history” is revealed.112
Recalling that at the time of its scrivening there were no clear markers delineating
between what would be the realm of crime and the realm of delict, it appears that capital
punishment was enforced by the state only in instances of treason, and also perhaps for
particularly grave religious transgressions, the relation between the two being that each
was considered an offense not against another individual but rather against the
commonwealth.113
Even for intentional murder (oarrucudas), the punishment would be determined
by the victims survivors (agnates). The family could seek blood vengeance, after a
judicial finding of intent and malice. For unintentional homicide and for delicts more
generally, payment of a prescribed number of cattle to the victim’s agnate might suffice.
For example, the TWELVE TABLES describes an unintentional slaying, and its
compensatory remedy, in this way: “[I]f the spear has rather flown from the hand than
been thrown”, the killer would surrender to the victim’s family a ram. The ram might
then be slaughtered in ritual vengeance, thus the term “scapegoat” attributed to
Augustinian period jurist Labeo.114
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Certain acts other than intentional homicide would warrant the victim or the
victim’s family putting the perpetrator to death, in each instance a revelation of the strong
theme of legitimized vengeance found throughout the TWELVE TABLES. This
countenanced vengeance can be seen as the very “self help” that the law of civil delict
would require another millennium or more to dispatch. Interesting as well, in many
instances the manner permitted for the execution of the punishment would bear a
conceptual similarity to the nature of the offense. The intentional arsonist could be
burned alive. One who stole crops at night could be hung at the location of the theft as a
sacrifice to Ceres, goddess of the harvest. A false accuser could be thrown into an
“abyss”.115
The victim’s prerogatives against certain transgressors revealed a liberality not
shown even in instances of alleged intentional homicide. An individual encountering a
thief “red handed” by night was permitted to kill him if the burglar was armed.116 If the
theft occurred during the day, slaying the perpetrator was approved if the victim first
cried out to neighbors for help (endoplorare = implorare) so as to permit corroboration
as to the permissibility of killing the thief.117 Alternatively, the victim could take the
thief to the magistrate, who could then return him to the victim. The recourse then was as
before, as the victim could kill the thief. Or, he could sell the thief as a slave, or demand
ransom from the thief’s family or others. For thieves not caught in the act, supercompensatory damages might be imposed in the form of moneys amounting to twice the
value of what was stolen.118
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Pursuant to the TWELVE TABLES, accidental personal injury triggered specific
remedies. For breaking the bone (os factum) of a free man, the remedy was retaliation in
kind,119 although the authority as to this differs, with another source indicating that the
breaking of a bone of a freedman the defendant was required to pay 300 as.120 The latter
penalty seems more in keeping with the tendency of the TWELVE TABLES to influence the
customary law in the direction away from the blood feud dimensions of customary law
and in the direction of a system in which penalties would be assessed in money,
livestock, or goods. For breaking the bone of a slave, the penalty was 150 as121, and for
less severe injuries, 25 as.122 The wrongful cutting down of a tree was likewise
penalized by a payment of 25 as.123
Numerous fines were set at multiples of the proved harm. They included, without
limitation, double the value of the wrong for usury, for a depositary who failed to
repaythe deposit, a seller of land who misrepresented the area of land, or a guardian
responsible for misadministration. A threefold multiple of the plaintiff’s loss would be
due for the misadministration of a receivership.124
Damages

The severity of the penalties associated with certain delicts can be

seen to relate directly to the gravity of the offense as it might be evaluated in an early
agricultural society. As mentioned, the intentional arsonist could be dispatched by
burning. Also considered capital offenses were the noctural theft of another’s crops or
permitting one’s animals to graze on another’s crops. If, however, one set fire to a
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another’s house by accident, he was responsible only in damages to be assessed at the
level of the value of the home, or if he was too poor to pay, he would be “lightly
chastised.”125 For what would later be termed either intentional torts or negligence-based
torts, it has been urged that at this early stage of Roman Law neither, as to the former,
the actor’s frame of mind nor the level of care employed were of moment.126
While numerous delicts against property, if proven would garner the victim a
percuniary award in the amount of the value of the property, still others would permit
recovery of two or even three times the actual loss suffered. As review of these
instances demonstrates that these multiple awards were resesrved for circumstances in
which either the conduct of the accused was more blameworthy, or the loss to the victim
could not be remedied with a simple compensatory award. For the wrongdoer discovered
to have in his home the possessions of the accuser, the penalty was three times the value
of the goods.127

B.

THE LEX AQUILIA AND CICERO

The TWELVE TABLES treatment of damage to property (damnum injuria datum)
was superceded by the Lex Aquilia (286-195 B.C.), advanced by Tribune of the Plebians
Aquilius (~286 B.C.).128 The Lex Aquilia, a Plebiscitum, was stimulated most probably
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by a popular movement and an ensuing plebiscite.129 Its three chapters reflected an
important step in synthesis of the evolving law for the securing of damages for private
wrongs, and it replaced all prior law regarding injury to persons or things.130 Reflective
significantly of modifications, some legal and some equitable, to the TWELVE TABLES at
the instance of a succession of Praetors, the Lex Aquilia preserved the general rule that
one was strictly liable for one’s actions. The most noteworthy exception pertained to
murder, with the Lex Aquilia differentiating between the intentional and the unintentional
taking of life.131 Its structure and substance became the most typical means of
proceeding in a matter of damnum injuria datum.132
In its general and specific sections together, the Lex Aquilia provided for remedies
for wrongs ranging from simple damage (damnum injuria datum) to fraudulent defenses
in legal proceedings (infitiatio).133 It is also credited with the introduction of elements of
fault (culpa), including absence of due care (today’s negligence) to the law of delict.
Should the actions of the wrongdoer (corpore) result directly or indirectly in harm to
another thing, the action would be directa actio Legis Aquiliae.134 If the injury was to a
slave or to a quadriped (quae pecu, i.e., cattle, sheep, etc.), the wrongdoer could be
obligated to pay as damages the highest value that the property had held over the
preceding year.135 The law included provisions intended to stimulate truth telling, for if a
person were to be found responsible, and to have willfully denied the claim against him,
129
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his payment for the wrong could be doubled. If the injury was not lethal, the damages
owed would be the highest value of the injured slave (or damaged property) within the
month previous to the injury. An actioin factum might arise if a person intentionally
drove his neighbor’s animal(s) into water, and they drowned.136
Under the Lex Aquilia, if property was damaged by direct contact, or by an
agency directed by the wrongdoer, and if the value of the property was diminished
thereby, the cause of action would be in directa actio Legis Aquiliae. If a slave or a
quadriped was killed, the actor could be bound to pay the highest value of the slave or the
animal during the preceding year.137 The third chapter provided for the case of a slave or
quadruped (quae pecudum) being damaged, or any thing else being damaged or
destroyed. In this case he had to pay the highest value that the thing had within the thirty
days preceding the unlawful act. If the damage was done to a thing (corpus), but not by a
corpus, there was an actio utilis Legis Aquiliae, which is also an actio in factumor on the
case. Such a case would occur when, for instance, a man should purposely drive his
neighbour's beast into a river and it should perish there.138
Later Roman law drew a distinction between injuries to the person and injuries to
property. The former were termed, and the later damnum injuria datum. A wrong
involving theft of property was termed furtum. When violence accompanied such a
wrong, it was termed rapina, or vi bona rapta.139 The protections afforded by the action
in injuria addressed directly the interests protected by today’s torts focusing on personal
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physical injury: the right to be free of physical interference with one’s own person. The
wrong would be redressable whether it was intentional or merely negligent, and could
include “a multifarious variety of wrongs”, such as, without limitation, striking,
whipping, kidnapping, or falsely imprisoning. It could also include wrongs that involve
no physical contact, such as insult in the presence of others (convicium facere),
defamation by spoken word, writing or deed,140or importunings to inchastity.141
Cicero (106-43 B.C.) wrote of the truth of an ethic that sounded simultaneously in
terms of corrective justice and deterrence-efficiency. In his ON MORAL DUTIES wrote
that even after “retribution and punishment” have been dealt to the transgressor, the
person who has been dealt the wrong owes a duty to bring a close to any such
misadventure by permitting a gesture such as repentance or apology.142 From the
extension to the wrongdoer of the opportunity to apologize or to repent could be reaped
the immediate good of reducing the likelihood that he would “repea[t] the offense.”, as
well as the broader and eventual good of “deter[ing] others from injustice.”143
As did Plato in THE LAWS, Cicero in his DE LEGIBUS included lengthy perorations
that contain sample ethical or legal models. The work was probably completed in 45
B.C., following interruptions in Cicero’s literary activity during his provincial
governorship and the Civil War (49-48 B.C.). In DE LEGIBUS Cicero adopts the approach
of Plato in THE LAWS, as Plato was the Athenian in THE LAWS, Cicero in DE LEGIBUS
plays himself, with Quintus and Atticus as the two others. Cicero (106 B.C. – 43 B.C.)
140
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was pronouncedly bound to a vision of natural law, writing in his DE LEGIBUS: “Law is
the highest reason, implanted by Nature, which commands what ought to be done, and
forbids the opposite.”144 With Law as the perfection of Nature, and since man’s “right
reason” leads him to law, in Cicero’s “learned men”, nature, reason, virtue and justice
coalesced to form Law that for reason of its perfection man shared with the gods.145
Cicero was, of course, not naïve, and he recognized as well man’s capacity for “evil
tendencies”.146147 Cicero commends Socrates for his criticism of those who segregate
considerations of utility from Justice, for this separation, Cicero claimed, “is the source of
all mischief.”148
At what level do justice and morality serve to deter persons from wrongdoing? As
to the latter, Cicero suggests that the man tempted to wrongdoing is given pause not so
much by an apprehension that he will be pursued by the Furies a recognition that he will
be beset “with the anguish of remorse and the torture of a guilty concience.”149
Reemphasizing the superiority of ethics to law in the fashioning of just behavior, Cicero
comments that the man who moderates his wrongful impulses solely for reasons external
to himself, i.e., the apprehension of punishment by law, or “some consideration of utility
and profit”, is “merely shrewd, not good.”150 To Cicero, Justice and morality were not
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fixed by opinion but rather by Nature[;].151 And good men would cleave to equity,
fairness, generosity and the discharge of duty just as Justice herself and “all the other
virtues are also to be cherished for their own sake.” True disinterested pursuit of good is
the proper goal, writes Cicero, or duty, equity and generosity “sought for its own sake.” If
man is motivated not by inner desire but rather by anticipated gain (or for that matter the
prospect of eluding punishment) his work is not just but rather for hire.152
Writing of duties extending beyond the family, Cicero subscribed to a species of
distributive justice that endorsed a concept that, insofar as possible, no one ought be left
behind. In his words: “Whether we bestow or requite a favor, duty requires, if other
things are equal, that we should help those who need our help most[.]”153 Nonetheless,
Cicero conceded, “[T]hat is not the way of the world.”154
As to persons beyond a benefactor’s core family or kinship group, to Cicero there
existed a duty to the entire world as to such things “we receive with profit and give
without loss.”155 Thus in order that we may receive such blessings as are identified in the
maxims such as “Keep no one from a running stream[;]” or “Let anyone who pleases take
a light from your fire[;]” or Give honest advice to a man in doublt[;]” Cicero writes, it
follows that we must be willing to give likewise of the same in order to “contributre to
the common weal.”156
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The Lician Laws of 367 B.C. led to the creation of a role of administrators of the
law, officials who were elected for terms of one year, and who bore the title of Praetor.
Although the task of the Praetor was to adminiter, rather than to make the law, beginning
in 242 B.C. the Praetor with urban jurisdiction, Praetor Urbanis, was permitted to
enlarge upon or otherwise shape existing law or custom when fairness so dictated.
Herein arose over time powers that would approximate those that at a later time would be
termed the powers of equity. Such offense as might be given by vesting in the Praetor
this authority was tempered with the knowledge that the risk of protracted abuse of office
was lessened due to the fact that he was subject to annual election. Upon his assumption
of office, each Praetor would issue a proclamation called an Edictum Perpetuum, which
purported to define the laws and remedies he would apply, but the one-year term of an
edictum perpetuum made the phrase oxymoronic. Moreover, the liberty afforded the
Praetor was constricted even more by the Lex Cornelie (67 B.C.) that forbade a Praetor
from violating his own Edict.157 The Lex Cornelia also, due to the inflation experienced
since the publication of the TWELVE TABLES, worked upward modifications in the sums
assigned as monetary remedies.158
A considerable amount of the Praetor’s influence over the development of equity
was brought to a close with the Edictum Perpetuum (~129-138 A.D.), by Salvius Julianus
at Hadrian’s command, that served to freeze the praetor’s interpretative flexibility by
requiring the enunciation of the law he intended to follow at the outset of the one-year
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praetorship, and proscribing any departure therefrom.159 Of greater importance, at this
time, four centuries before the reign of Justinian I, Hadrian assumed complete legislative
power, with the effect of making all law, public and private alike, at the will of the
Emperor.

C. LATER ROMAN LAW-THE INSTITUTES AND INTERPRETATIONS
Numerous codifications or collections of the law preceded the 533 A.D. Code of
Justinian. A collection of Imperial statutes was prepared by the jurist Papirius Justus in
the latter part of the second century A.D. Under Diocletian there was prepared a Codex
Gregorianus recorded constitutions to the approximate date of 295 A.D. There followed a
Codex Hermogenianus that compiled constitutions up to approximately 365, and then a
Codex Theodosianus under the auspices of Theodosius II that pertained to the Eastern
Empire, and completed in 439 at the instance of Valentinian III for the Western
Empire.160
The later Roman Law of delict derived from the TWELVE TABLES, and of course
the customary law that preceded the TWELVE TABLES, as further designed at the warp and
woof of jurists and praetors to produce as complete as possible structure of civil
liability.161 It is recognized now as a major development “from archaic formalism to
rationalism[.]”162
Of the sources of later Roman law the Institutes of Justinian (483-562 A.D.)
proclaim: “Our law comes either from written or unwritten sources, just as among the
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Greeks; some laws are written, others unwritten. Written law comprises legislation , legis
(enactments of the comitia), plebiscites, resolutions of the Senate, the will of the Emperor
(in its various manifestations, the edicts of magistrates, and the answers of the
learned.”163 Today in civil code nations courts place repeated reliance upon the
interpretations of the law by legal scholars, and this practice originated in Roman law,
where involvement of jurists was pervasive and practically plenipotentiary. Participation
of Jurists in identification of the appropriate interpretation law was a pressing need in the
setting of voluminous legal sources in the near millennium since the TWELVE TABLES and
competing interpretations thereof. In 426 A.D. Theodosiums II enacted “The Law of
Citations, which appointed the writings of five jurists, Papinian, Paulus, Gaius, Ulpian
and Modestinus, as the principal heuristic devices for the interpretation of the law, and
further declared that if the writings of these Jurisconsuls would, if in agreement, be
conclusive on any matter of interpretation. In the event of a tie, the conclusion of
Papinian would be adopted. The act of Theodosiums II of incorporating the learned work
of this finite group of revered jurists as a necessary part of legal interpretation and
jurisprudential application continued and elevated the role assigned the Decemvirs in the
creation of the TWELVE TABLES, and was followed, predictably, by Justinian I in his
publication of his later Code, Institutes, and Digests.
The Code of Justinian was one of a three-part presentation of Roman law.
Published in 533 and the two years immediately following, the first part, the Code, was
intended as a succinct manual for study by lawyers, jurists and students of law. The
Institutes of Justinian comprised the second part, and were a reduction and modernization
163
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into twenty volumes of the literally thousands of volumes interpreting, codifying and
analyzing Roman law since the time of the TWELVE TABLES, quite a millennium before.
The third part were the Digests, or Pandects, which were the works Rome’s most
celebrated jurists. Their work did not represent commentary on the compilation of
Justinian, as some of the work of these jurists preceded the Code and the Institutes by
hundreds of years. Yet as the work of revered jurists charged in their own time with
interpretation of the evolving Roman Law, Justinian identified the Digests as a principal
and enduring source to which contemporary jurists and lawyers ought turn in
understanding and interpreting the Code of Justinian and the Institutes of Justinian.
Together, the Code, the Institutes, and the Digests comprised the great Corpus Juris of
533 A.D., the great compilation of Roman Law credited with systematizing classic
Roman law. It is in the Corpus Juris that scholars now identify that in Roman law “the
goal of compensation of damage began to prevail over the goal of punishment and
sanction.” 164
For this undertaking Justinian employed the assistance of Tribonian,165 who
thereupon enlisted the help of nine jurists to the task of editing the combined
compilations, referenced above, of Gregorian, Hermogenian and Theodosian. This Code
of Justinian was presented, as had been its predecessor a millennium before, in 12 books
or tables. Then Tribonian and seventeen lawyers set about the task of extracting from,
rationalizing and modernizing perhaps 2000 treatises, the work of the finest jurists in
Roman law. They reduced this body of jurisprudence to approximately fifty books, that
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would be called the Digests or Pandects. Most conspicuous among the contributions to
the Digests were the works of Gaius, Ulpianus, Paulus and Marcianus.
The Institutes and the Digests of the Jurisconsuls urged strongly a natural law
orientation of Roman Law. “All peoples who are governed by law and customs use law
which is in part particular to themselves, in part common to all men; the law which each
people has established for itself is particular to that state and is styled civil law as being
particularly of that state: by what natural reason has established among all men is
observed equally by all nations and is designated ius gentium or the law of nations, being
that which all nations obey. Hence the Roman people observe partly their own particular
law, partly that which is common to all peoples.”166 Evidencing a similarly full-throated
natural law commitment to principles of universal duty applicable to all men, the Third
Century jurist Ulpian, quoting Celsus, wrote: “Justice is a fixed and abiding disposition to
give every man his rights. The percepts of the law are as follows: to live honorably, to
injure no one, to give to every man his own. Jurisprudence is a knowledge of things
human and divine, the science of the just and the unjust.” 167
Committed to the identification of the delineation between “what is “just and what
unjust”, The Institutes of Justinian and other sources of Roman law reflect an endeavor to
“give each man his due right”, and comprises “precepts” to all Romans “to live justly, not
to injure another and to render to each his own.”168 Violation of a “personal action” not
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sounding in contract is in delict.169 The Institutes include rules that reveal numerous
strictures against the imposition of one’s will over the rights of a neighbor, and strong
deterrents for the disregard thereof. In one notable example, pertaining to what would
today be called the law of private nuisance or trespass, a particular provision goes so far
as to detail a preference that adjoining landowners bargain in advance for agreement as to
contemporaneous uses of land that might trigger dispute. In Book III par. 4, the Institutes
provide that one “wishing to create” such a right of usage “should do so by pacts and
stipulations.”170 A testator of land may impose such agreements reached upon his heirs,
including limitations upon building height, obstruction of light, or introduction of a beam
into a common wall, or the construction of a catch for a cistern, an easement of passage,
or a right of way to water.171 To much the same effect, and specifically as to urban
estates, is Book III, Title II par. 2 as interpreted by Gaius in his INSTITUTES OF ROMAN
LAW,172 to which Ulpianus, adds a prohibition on the obstruction of a neighbor’s view.173
Just as today an emotional distress component to an award for personal physical
injury may amplify the compensatory award received by the victim, so to in Roman law
the transgressor might be liable to the victim for greater damages when the wrong took
place in circumstances that would worsen the harm’s same or degradation. Thus at the
penalty phase, a penalty would be made greater if the injuria occurred in a public place.
169

GAIUS, THE INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW, Fourth Commentary par. 3 in SMITH & WEISSTUB, id at 353,
from THE INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW BY GAIUS 442- 443 (E. Post Trans. 1925).(J.A.C. Thomas trans
1975).
170
The INSTITUTES OF GAIUS continue: “He can also, by will, charge his heir not to build beyond a given
height or not to obstruct the light of the neighbor’s premises or to allow the latter to insert a beam into the
wasll or to accept raindroppings; as also to allow the neighbor a right of passage over his land or to draw
water there.” THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN BOOK III par. 4, in SMITH & WEISSTUB, supra note 73 at 358,
from THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 84, 85 (J.A.C. Thomas trans 1975).
171
Id.
172
Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book VII, THE DIGEST (or PANDECTS) BOOK VIII TITLE II par. 2., id.at
359.
173
Ulpanius, on Sabinus, Book XXIX, id. at Title II par 3, id. at 359.

51

The same aggravation of penalty might accompany a battery in which a man is beaten
with sticks, or scourged, or when parents are beaten by their children, or a patron struck
by a freedman, or where the injury is to a particularly valuable part of the body, such as
the eye.174
Slaves qua slaves had no redress in injuria. Indeed, masters were permitted to
flog their own slaves. Conceptually, the slave was not a being in any entire sense, but
instead a unit of labor that could lose value if mistreated. However, if another were to
injure a master’s slaves, the action in injuria was deemed to devolve to the master, as an
action in insult, irrespective of whether the actor intended any insult. This would be so
even when no severe injury was involved.

Should the slave’s injury be severe, the

Praetor could grant to the master an action in injuria.175 The imputation of an injury
suffered by a slave to the master has been described as a progenitor to the later law of
agency. The reasoning given is that under Roman Law the slave had no legal standing,
and in a juridical sense was absorbed into his master’s family, and represented before the
law by his master. In later eras of freed men or freed servants, it would be a substantial
but measured step to visualize the free servant as enjoying a relation to the master
(employer) similar to that of the ancient slave to his master. The final step to this
analysis is the identification circumstances, be they broad or narrow, in which the actions
of the servant are treated in a legal sense as the actions of the master. In Holmes’ words:
“This is the progress of ideas as shown us by history; and this is what is meant by saying
that the characteristic feature which justifies agency as a title of the law is the absorbtion
pro hac vice of the agent’s legal individuality in that of his principal.”
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If a wrongful injury was inflicted upon a child (persons under potestas), the
remedy in injuria would lay in the father (paterfamilias), who could bring an action both
on his behalf and on behalf of his child.176 From what appears, this approach partakes at
least in half measure of that taken for injuries to slaves, with the damage to the father
being essentially on in insult and/or lost services.
Theft

Originally, Roman Law treated theft as delictual, or a civil wrong, with

accompanying penalties, as referenced below. Only later would theft be catalogued as
criminal. Thus for the purposes of the present description, theft can be compared to the
various later common law delicts of conversion, trover di bonis asportatis, etc.
Wrongs to Moveable Property Roman law regarding injury to property was
sufficiently supple to recognize variations of injury. The actor could interfere with
property by two means: (1) deprive the owner of possession by (a) stealth (furtum), or (b)
by violence (vi bona rapta). The wrongdoer might also interfere with the occupier’s
rights without dispossessing him of the property by damaging the property or otherwise
impairing its usefulness (damnum injuria datum).177
A man suspecting that his property had been asported to another’s house was
permitted to search for it, but only upon seeking entry dressed only in a loincloth
(licium), and carrying a plate. The origins of the requirement of a loin cloth are thought
to predate the separation of the Indo-Germanic, and most probably have a common sense
rationale of minimizing the potential that the accuser would contrive to hide goods
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beneath his clothes and later claim that they had been found in the accuseds home. No
similar explanation of the requirement of the plate is apparent.178
Other provisions reflective of the slaveholding era are not of central significance
to this treatment but nevertheless worthy of mention as an early example of a
commitment that the substance of the law be favored over its formal requisites if such an
approach was necessary to the imposition of justice. One delict that occurred with
sufficient frequency as to prompt its inclusion in the Institutes was the third-party’s
seduction of another’s slave to steal from its master for the benefit of the third party. In
order to catch the perpetrator, the law permitted the master to carry out what would today
be termed a “’sting” operation, in which the slave would take some goods to the
wrongdoer to permit the completion of the wrong. While some jurists were uncertain if
the action for theft by stealth (action furti) or action for corruption of a slave (actio servi
corrupti) could be brought, as the owner had consented to the movement of the goods,
and the slave had not in fact succumbed to corruption, Justinian disagreed that “such
subtlety” should preclude the bringing of both actions.179

2. Personal Actions
Gaius , in his Fourth Commentary to his INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW,
differentiated personal actions from real actions. A “personal action” was “an action
which seeks to enforce an obligation imposed on the defendant by his contract or delict”,
with delict, for the purposes of the Commentary confined to contracts, transfers of
property, or promises of performance. It is in his description of “real” actions that we
178
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find the description of modern delict, with a strong emphasis on the torts that today fall
into the categories of nuisance and trespass. A “real” action was “an action by which one
claims as one’s own in the intentio some corporeal thing or some particular right in the
thing, as a right of use or usafruct of a thing belonging to a neighbor, or the right of a
horse way, of carriageway through his land, of raising one’s house above a certain height,
or having the prospect of one’s windows unobstructed; or, when the opposite party (that
is the owner) brings the negative action, asserting that there is no such right in the
thing.”180

2. Defense of Person and Property
A man was not free to defend his property with the same freedom as obtained in
defending his person. An occupant of property could resist a burglar with non-lethal
force.

However, in what seems to be an equivalent of a modern (if not universal) rule,

one discovering a burglar could not kill him unless he was unable to escape from peril
without endangering himself.181

IV

Conclusion

As is true of tort law today is equivalently true of Graeco-Roman law of delict,
tort law has alwaysrepresent ed a society’s revealed truth as to its better self, and further
to so doing, has identified the behaviors it wishes to encourage and the behaviors it
180
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wishes to discourage. the conclusion is inescapable that no organizing principle will be
adequate to explain the entirety of the law of delict, and this is true of tort law today as it
is of Graeco-Roman Law. As expressed by Gerald W. Postema, “[T]ort practice appears
to be too heterogenous to submit easily to the strictures of any single- valued explanatory
theory. Some part of the tort balloon seems to pop out, regardless of the shape of the
explanatory box we construct.”182
This article has focused upon Western law, and more specifically upon the
markers, some clear and some vague, within the experience of the ancient Greeks and the
ancient Romans that informed our modern law of civil remedies for harm. More so with
the Greek experience than with the Roman, the progress has not been invariably smooth.
But in a Hegelian sense, progress it has nonetheless been. From the practices
countenanced by the ancients, which focused upon kinship rights, retribution and
vengeance, and which countenanced self help as the primary remedy for wrongs, by the
time of the Corpus Juris Civilis Western law had made a permanent commitment to
peaceable resolution of disputes, often before juries, and the adoption of rectificatory
justice in place of criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings for all but the most aggravated
offenses.
In terms of civil justice generally, the Greeks and the Romans identified
effectuated protections in a sprawling array of delicts that would inform all of later
Western law. For personal physical injury, a nonexclusive recitation would include
intentional and unintentional battery, maiming, wrongful death, and defenses, if limited,
therefore: accident and mistake among them. For damage to personal property, causes of
action were permitted for harms ranging from the killing or injury of animals to the
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converion of personal items. Fraud or deceit were penalized to the extent that such
actions might induce an unfair sale of property or an unjust legal defense, among other
poetential distortions of justice. Personal dignitary wrongs from defamation to turning a
citizen away from a public bath were prohibited, while there existed seemingly no
cultural expectation that a “love balm” cause of action would be recognized. Limited
powers of equity permitted the Praetor, even if by obvious contrivance, avoid imposition
or denial of legal remedies that offended the community sense of fairness. And the
entirety of ancient Geek and ancient Roman law moved definably towards the remedies
of compensatory justice over violent retribution.
Contemplating the respective contributions to modern Western law of the Greeks
and the Romans of the eras under discussion, some have suggested that elegance and
erudition of the Greeks represent juridical contributions that surpass those of the Romans.
Those so proposing point to the lasting philosophical contributions of the Hellenist
period, the philosophers’ employment of dialectical and negative pregnant reasoning, and
their appreciation that ethics should stand on an equivalence with law. The Greeks
developed and conveyed ethics, the norms that might or might not eventually find there
way into law, but which even if remaining simple ethics, obligated the adherent to
examine individual questions of conscience and morality. Their great thinkers advanced
philosophy and the engines of dialectical reasoning that power it. It would be Grecian
ethics, philosophy and reasoning together that permitted the receptivity to re-analysis and
to ongoing change that has preserved the intellectual importance of the ancient Hellenist
period. What did the Romans bring to the table, thequare concludes, other than
organization and systematization?
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For the Greeks, at least from a philosophical and not necessarily a statutory
perspective, the objective of the law giver was to give direction to people, which is to
say, to identify the “right” objectives of desire and the most worthy objectives of man and
society. In contrast, for the Romans, from the time of the TWELVE TABLES through and
including that of Justinian, and even at the intellectual level of their Jurisconsuls, the
premium was placed not upon theistic canon, the science of law, or intellectual education,
but rather upon the written recitation of and organized body of law, suitable to its time.
By the close of the reign of Justinian I these advancements, among others, could
be counted: (1) the adoption of money damages as the dominant remedy in resolving
civil disputes; (2) the identification of instance in which strict liability for the
consequences of one’s actions might not apply, such as in the instance of action not
voluntarily taken or taken without culpa; (3) the codification of numerous beneficial
interests in land or its enjoyment, and the normalization of means for protecting them,
including introduction of the preference for ex anteresolution of prospectiv e disputes
between neighboring landowners; (4) transparency in decision making, by dint of
requiring successive praetors to pronounce the law they would apply and to forgo
application of any other; and (5), notwithstanding the noted limitation on the power of the
praetor, recognition that in instances where the application of a legal remedy, or the
absence of one, would work a manifest unfairness, the implicit vesting in the praetor not
to defy the law but rather to find a means why the law should be inapplicable.183
Particularly taking into account their tradition-bound endeavors at codification,
and that most of their leading philosopher’s plied their ideas beyond the centers of
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political or judicial power, the Greek legal legacy was not so visionary as some might
suppose, or at least have hoped. Nor for that matter were the Roman contributions so
symbolic of stasis as some have claimed. Neither the Grecian nor the Roman
contributions would, standing alone, provide the foundational support for later Western
law that together they represent, and comparing the Greek contribution with that of the
Roman is really nothing more than an intellectual diversion. In truth the two civilizations,
and their respective comparisons, are sui generic, and no more suited to comparison than
apples and oranges. It is unquestionably true that the ancient Romans never elevated
issues of ethic, philosophy or self-challenging jurisprudence that might have been hoped
for in the one thousand years between the TWELVE TABLES and the publication of the
Corpus Juris Civilis. The Romans did produce, however, what the Greeks could never
have, and it was this: A one thousand-year written, closely examined and regularly
revisited experiment in a rule of law by civil and criminal code. In many ways picking
up where the custom-bound endeavors of Greece’s Draco and Solon left off, the Romans
solidified the terra firma of Western law.
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